Malcolm Clough leads a visit to the Pegasus Bridge

The Pegasus Bridge over the Caen Canal, between Caen and Ouistreham, saw one of the first actions of D-Day.

While 7^th Battalion fought for possession of Benouville and Le Port, 12^th and 13^th Battalions supported by 4^th Anti-Tank Battery faced more serious counter attacks from the south. Had 21^st Pz Division, the closest armoured formation to the coast, been ordered to attack during the first hours of the invasion then they would have been able ‘to take advantage of the initial confusion amongst our opponents…We made a thorough calculation of our chances of pushing through to the coast ’ (Von Luck, 1989, 173) Significantly, the division had been unable to move until General Marcks, (whether authorized (sic) or not) ordered an attack to eliminate the airborne troops on the Orne at 0630hrs.

An attack by a whole Panzer Division with over 100 tanks would have been extremely difficult for 5^th Parachute Brigade to resist, but at 1600hrs Marcks changed his orders and diverted the bulk of 21^st Panzer against ‘Sword’ beach. Von Lucks 125^th Pz Grenadier Regt reinforced by a reconnaissance battalion, an assault gun battalion and a platoon of Anti-Tank guns would still attack the airborne bridgehead. Von Luck’s attack was halted before Escoville where it ran into heavy bombardment from fighter-bombers and naval gun fire.

Marcks’ decision to detach Von Luck to deal with the airborne forces was much criticised by 21^st Panzer’s Commanding Officer Edgar Feuchtinger ‘The absence of the Panzergrenadier regiment, one artillery battalion, the anti-tank battalion and the Army AAA battalion…and the combat tasks on both sides of the Orne, all had fateful consequences on the course of combat on 6^t June 1944’ (Isby, 2004:222)  Those elements of 21^st Pz on the western bank of the Caen canal succeeded in reaching  the coast at Lion sur Mer but were too weak to sustain their position. Certainly the threat of 6^th Airborne Division on the eastern flank was significant in diverting troops away from the main thrust.

The Merville Battery presented a formidable obstacle protected by machine guns, mines, wire and ditches. General Gale realised it could only be effectively neutralised by an airborne assault prior to the landings. Bombing alone would not be sufficient. Only a direct hit by a heavy bomb would penetrate the 6’ thick concrete casemates and each gun would have to be hit in turn. One raid could never achieve this and furthermore, to protect the location of the invasion, many other similar coastal batteries would have to be bombed. ‘For these reasons a direct assault on the battery by airborne troops was necessary.’  (Barber, 2002:25)  Colonel Otway commanding 9^th Battalion decided on a complicated plan with paratroops attacking from the south whilst gliders carrying anti-tank guns and flame throwers landed within the compound.

9^th Battalion’s drop was badly scattered, many of the men landed too far to the east to reach the Rendezvous Point in time, while others landed in the flooded areas and were drowned. Most of the equipment containers carrying mortars and machine guns were also lost. The assault gliders failed to find the battery and crashed well outside. That Colonel Otway and his men still pressed home their attack and furthermore succeeded is testament to the quality and calibre of the men and to their meticulous training. Brigadier Hill describes their achievement thus ‘The men of the 9^th Battalion…were capable of breaking the sound barrier of normal human endurance and lived to fight on when there should have been nothing left’ (Barber,2002:9)

The significance of the capture of the Merville Battery has led to much debate, Hastings argues that ‘The costly battle to gain the Merville Battery was a fine feat of arms rendered anti-climactic by the discovery that the casemates mounted only 75mm guns with slight capacity to harass  the beaches.’  (Hastings, 1984:88)  However Hastings’ research has been shown to be inaccurate. The battery was not equipped with four75mm guns but larger Czech 100mm howitzers which, although smaller than the 150mm guns thought to be installed, would have caused significantly more damage to the troops landing on ‘Sword’ beach. (Fowler, 2003:99)

Thompson argues that the attack was a success. Not because it prevented the battery from firing on ‘Sword’ but because the batteries tasks included fire missions north of the Orne and Caen Canal Bridges, which Thompson describes as ‘far more threatening to the success of the D-day operations than firing on the beaches…9 Para neutralized (sic) the battery during the critical time that the other coup de main operation was in progress’ (Thompson, 1989:148)

 6 June 1944. D-Day.

Commandos of No. 4 Commando, 1st Special Service Brigade, and troops of 6th Airborne Division in Bénouville after the link-up between the two forces, 6 June 1944.

According to Neil Barber, although the battery had not been built to directly threaten the beach it had the capability to do so, firing at a rate of six rounds per minute for all four guns. That it did not, was a direct result of the attack by 9^th Battalion.

‘Sword beach was not molested by the Merville Battery on D-Day. It did not ‘wreak havoc’ and prevent the establishment of the beachhead’ (Barber, 2002:214).

The allied planners could not have foreseen the batteries true role in defending against an invasion but as Hastings explains- they could not ignore it. ‘The suppression of positions such as the Merville Battery was a vital piece of insurance.’ (Hastings, 1984:74)

The tasks of 8^th Battalion together with the Canadians were to destroy the five bridges over the River Dives and having done so to consolidate on the Bois De Bavent ridge, thereby denying it to the enemy. Such a task was well suited to parachute forces they would be able to reach and blow up the bridges before local German forces had time to react. An assault force landing over the beaches from ‘Sword’ or further along the coast between Ouistreham and Cabourg would take far too long to reach the objective.

That 8^th Battalion and the Canadians succeeded was a triumph of initiative and improvisation. The two battalions were badly scattered following their parachute drops, in particular 8th Battalion who had the worst drop of the whole division, being split between DZ’s K and N. At 0120hrs Alistair Pearson commanding 8^th battalion found only 30 men had reached the Rendezvous Point. By 0400 this increased to ‘11 officers and 145 other ranks, including 6 sappers, and equipment which amounted to a light machine gun, two PIATs, two jeeps and four radios’ (Clarke, 2004:53)

The Chief Engineer assigned to 8th Battalion, Major Roseveare, had landed on DZ N. Realising this error and the need to move quickly, he decided not to make for the Rendezvous Point. He rounded up as many other sappers and explosives as he could find and set off on foot towards Troan and Bures. On reaching a crossroads 3 miles from Troan Bridge Roseveare adapted his plan and detached the majority of his party to deal with the road and rail bridges at Bures while he and a section dashed in a commandeered jeep for the bridge at Troan. After a hair-raising charge through the town, Roseveare succeeded in creating a 15’ breach in the bridge. Meanwhile the bridges at Bures were also destroyed.

Pearson however, was unaware of Roseveare’s success and during the day, once his battalion was strong enough, he sent a second party to destroy the bridge at Troan, which after another fire-fight succeeded in widening the breach to 70’ (Crookenden, 1976: 215) Once he was sure his objectives had been completed Pearson withdrew to the Bois de Bavent Ridge.

The Canadian Battalion landed on Drop Zone V and like 9^th Battalion were badly scattered. Once again many men drowned in the flooded areas or were blown too far to the East. The Canadians however, regrouped and succeeded in their tasks of protecting 9^th Battalion’s attack at Merville and destroying the bridges at Robehomme and Varaville. The Battalion then withdrew to occupy the crucial cross roads on the Bois de Bavent Ridge at Le Mesnil. The Canadians were joined by 8th and 9^th Battalions and together they occupied the length of the Bois De Bavent Ridge to prevent German forces from observing the invasion beaches or from breaking through to the bridges at Benouville.

The destruction of the bridges over the River Dives was a success. By destroying them 12^th SS Panzer were prevented from reaching the invasion beaches on D-day. Instead of joining with 21^st Pz and attacking the invasion on the flank, the division spent the 6^th June moving east towards Caen and the only available bridges across the River Orne and the Caen Canal open to the Germans. During the advance from Lisieux the division had been subjected to attacks from R.A.F. fighter bombers ‘The number of our vehicles knocked out by the enemy keeps growing…We are hunted relentlessly, but cannot afford to take cover…Tuesday 6^th June, cost the 12^th SS Pz eighty-three men…the division had yet to engage the enemy.’  (Hargreaves, 2006:56).

Having achieved all their D-Day objectives, the Parachute Brigades were reinforced during the evening by the welcome arrival of much of the remainder of the division. Two Battalions of the Air-Landing Brigade landed on the West side of the Caen Canal on Landing Zone ‘W.’ The 2^nd Ox and Bucks and the 1st Royal Ulster Rifles together with the Divisional Armoured Reconnaissance Group, equipped with Tetrarch Light tanks moved south to reinforce the 12^th and 13^th Battalions to the South-West of Ranville and Le Bas De Ranville.

There were insufficient gliders and tugs to bring in the third Air-Landing Battalion the 12^th Devons’ and the 3^rd Anti-Tank Battery, who landed across ‘Sword’ on D+1. It had taken two lifts and 36 hours for the whole division to arrive in Normandy. The weaknesses in this slow build up were not exposed thanks to the weight of Naval and Royal Artillery fire-power together with the ground attack support from the Royal Air Force. Once again, during the battle for Arnhem in September 1944, 1^st Airborne Division landed in two lifts, but without the support of the Artillery or Air Force the below strength airborne forces were overwhelmed. ‘It had taken the bitter disaster of Arnhem to drive home the point that airborne troops…must be taken in one lift’ (Thompson, 1989: 288)